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Abstract 
 
In light of the ongoing refugee crisis, Germany has proven itself as a humanitarian leader. The 
country has accepted more refugees than any other country in the European Union and has some 
of the most liberal policies in regards to refugee admittance. Some speculate that Germany’s 
policies and attitudes stem from a desire to break from stereotypes that remain from World War 
II and the Holocaust. At the same time, Germany has also experienced a rise in far-right populist 
attitudes, evident through the success of the AfD party in the 2017 parliamentary election. This 
majority of the AfD’s base is composed of younger individuals, those under 40. These 
nationalist, anti-immigrant ideas contradict the image Germany has been struggling to build for 
itself since the end of World War II. Older individuals are more familiar with this struggle. They 
experience collective guilt more intensely, as they lived through much of Germany’s turbulent 
history.  
 
This study analyzes the 2016 Pew Global Attitudes Dataset to explore whether older individuals 
in Germany will perceive refugees in their country more positively when compared to other 
countries. I hypothesize that older German individuals will have more positive perception scores 
than older individuals in other countries and that the variable of age in Germany will not follow 
the trends outlined in the literature as strongly. Results suggest that overall trends in Germany 
do not necessarily break from the trends present in other European countries, but that age is less 
significant of an indicator of perception when compared to other demographic variables and 
other countries.  
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Introduction  
Europe has seen an unprecedented rise of far-right parties. While this trend was thought 
to be unique to in Eastern Europe and former Soviet regions, Western Europe has also seen an 
increase in support for these far-right parties. The recent refugee crisis which flooded Europe 
with Middle Eastern refugees and likely led to an upswing in terror attacks has prompted this 
ideological shift. Western European countries such as Italy, France, Switzerland, Denmark, 
Finland, Belgium, Germany, and Austria have seen a growth in momentum for far-right, anti-
immigrant parties. The exceptions to this movement include Spain and Portugal, which both 
have large Muslim populations and thus do not see the same support for anti-immigrant 
movements. In regards to the countries that have been experiencing this trend, it is often difficult 
to compare where the movement has caught on the strongest because parliamentary elections do 
not occur on the same schedule across Europe. There are also a variety of differences between 
the far-right parties for each country that may skew a comparison of their success rates.  
In the 2017 election, Germany’s far-right AfD- Alternativ für Deutschland party 
(Alternative for Germany) received 12.6% of the vote. France and Austria also had 
parliamentary elections in 2017 and saw far-right parties receiving upwards of 20% of the 
popular vote1. Finland, Denmark, and Switzerland all had elections in 2015 with far-right parties 
also receiving over 20% of the vote. Many Eastern European countries see far-right parties 
																																																						
1 The Netherlands also had an election in 2017 where the far-right party received approximately 
14% of the popular vote. Is important to note that while this does not fall into the general trend, 
the upwards momentum of this party is still present. Also significant that the Dutch parliament 
only has 30/127 left-leaning members of parliament. The same is true of Britain- while the far-
right party gained an increased presence in the 2015 election, Brexit led to a decrease in the 2017 
election.  
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holding over half the seats in parliament. These countries often see the most substantial impact 
from refugees because of geographical proximity to the Middle East.  
Within Europe, Germany became a leader in the refugee crisis. In 2015, Germany 
received 476,000 asylum applications and absorbed over 890,000 refugees from places such as 
Iraq and Syria. A lack of accountability in setting and adhering to quotas across Europe led 
Chancellor Angela Merkel to push for stricter policies on refugee admittance. Even now in 2018, 
Germany is still processing hundreds of thousands of asylum applicants. 
The media has approached Germany’s leadership role in the global refugee crisis as a 
chance for Germany to become a “moral leader” (Hewitt, 2015). In regards to German history, 
extensive research exists on the effects of “Vergangenheitsbewältigung” or German Collective 
Guilt. This concept applies to the guilt and shame that Germans still feel concerning the horrors 
committed by their ancestors during the Holocaust. German shame was most prevalent 
immediately following World War II, and many of the individuals who experienced this 
firsthand are still alive. Ever since then, Germany has witnessed an inability to completely 
distance itself from its history. Many view the humanitarian approach to the refugee crisis as an 
attempt to do so. While this may be the case, it cannot be ignored that 13% of Germans voted for 
the AfD party in the 2017 parliamentary elections. Their platform uses rhetoric which contradicts 
the idea that Germany can become a humanitarian haven for refugees. The AfD views Islam as 
an alien to German society, and AfD leader Alexander Gauland has talked about “fighting the 
invasion of foreigners” (BBC, 2015). The surge in AfD popularity came about as a response to 
Merkel’s approach to the refugee crisis. The growing number of terror attacks throughout Europe 
has fueled anxiety and led Germans to latch onto the AfD message. There are a series of 
interesting trends which explain the origin of the AfD’s voter base. Many AfD supporters have 
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tried to end the taboo on Nazi-era thinking. The ideas of “German-ness,” the danger of a 
multicultural society, and individuals who clung to these ideas have found a way to reemerge 
within the AfD. Another notable trend is the geographical location of the AfD voters. While East 
and West Germany reunified in 1990, the electoral map tells a different story. Former communist 
East Germany carried the AfD to their 94 parliamentary seats. This may stem from frustrations 
with the East German economy and a general feeling of disenfranchisement from the rest of the 
country. This theory is also supported by the fact that the leftist socialist party also received the 
most votes in the Eastern part of Germany.  
The trend that I hope to examine in regards to voting behavior and in turn, attitudes 
towards refugees, is that of age. The age demographics of the AfD highlight some of the most 
interesting trends about German collective guilt and the aforementioned idea of Germany as a 
moral leader. The party is the most popular among younger Germans. While the CDU received a 
majority of votes across age groups, the AfD almost the same number of votes as the SPD among 
30-44 year olds. Individuals over 60 were least likely to cast their vote for the AfD when 
compared to all other age demographics (ZEIT, 2015). This voting pattern contradicts trends 
found throughout the literature regarding the correlation between being conservative parties and 
age. The relationship between age and conservatism presents as linear, with conservatism 
increasing as age increases. On this spectrum, the AfD is the most right-wing party in Germany, 
yet older individuals were more likely to vote for more the more centrist parties. While this does 
not prove that older individuals have positive attitudes towards refugee admittance, it does 
demonstrate that they do not feel strongly enough about the subject to vote for the AfD, as many 
younger Germans did. The idea of Germany as a moral leader and the country’s aim to distance 
itself from the Holocaust may be more prevalent among older individuals who directly 
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experienced the past from which Germany so desperately wants distance. The only indicator of 
attitudes towards refugees among older populations when compared to younger populations 
come from election data. By further understanding the role of German Collective Guilt in 
decision-making processes of German people, I hope to shed light on potential policy 
implications and future trends as the demography of the population continues to change.  
In this paper, I will first review the existing literature surrounding the various factors 
which may influence perceptions of immigrants and refugees. Next, I will discuss the theory 
behind collective guilt and examine how the concept has been conceptualized and examined in 
past research. I will present my hypotheses about the role of the Holocaust Complex in 
determining how German people will perceive refugee admittance in their country. I will 
describe the data I use to test my hypotheses, as well as controlling for the factors outlined in the 
literature review to best isolate the dependent variable. From the results of my data cleaning and 
analysis, I will determine the accuracy of my hypotheses, discuss the potential implications of 
these results, draw conclusions and identify potential policy implications and areas of future 
study.  
Collective Guilt 
I build my hypothesis around the central idea of Vergangenheitsbewältigung or German 
collective guilt. This term translated, means “the struggle to come to terms with or overcome the 
past”. This term is the overarching concept which has become important to the study of post-
1945 German literature, society, culture, and politics. It raises questions of responsibility for the 
Holocaust and World War II as well as referring to the embarrassment and sense of remorse 
Germans felt and continue to experience for the war crimes of World War II and the Holocaust. 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung is a concept which is studied across disciplines, as it affects all 
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facets of German life. In regards to immigration, the literature focuses on the sense of identity it 
creates, and how this, in turn, leads to the isolation of migrants because they do not have this 
sense of shared guilt that largely defines the culture. Group identification, group glorification, 
and group attachment are vital throughout studies conducted on the presence of collective guilt. 
(Özkan, 2014). The majority of the research done on the topic is in the field of psychology and 
focus on networks and dynamics within cultures and other homogeneous groups. In-group 
dynamics are vital to the manifestation of collective guilt, as an individual has to identify with 
the group to bear the load of the collective.  
Other factors affect the manifestation of collective guilt. Aside from group identification, the 
presentation of the Holocaust and of collective guilt are vital to its manifestation in individuals. 
Existing research on the concept establishes the importance of presentation and framing. A study 
conducted in 2005 revealed that the presentation of social inequality in terms of in-group 
privilege leads privileged group members tend to feel collective guilt more strongly than when it 
is presented in terms of out-group disadvantage. Proximity and the establishment of a direct 
connection to an issue are vital in the construction of group dynamics (Powell, Branscombe, & 
Schmitt, 2005).  
In regards to Germany and the Holocaust, there is no consensus on the strength of the 
collective guilt. Some researchers conclude that there is a low level of collective guilt among 
German because of the convoluted relationship between the past and the present (Imhoff, 
Bilewicz, & Erb, 2012; Leach, Zeineddine, & Cehajic-Clancy, 2013). The education of younger 
generations about the events of the Holocaust is central in creating and maintaining this proximal 
relationship.  
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There is no consensus on how to examine, operationalize, or measure collective guilt because 
of the abstract and multifaceted nature of the issue. Previous the studies manage to operationalize 
the collective guilt with different mechanisms (Imhoff, Wohl, & Erb, 2013; Peetz, Gunn, & 
Wilson, 2010). In one study, researchers elicited high levels of collective guilt when the ongoing 
consequences of negative action were emphasized by manipulating the subjective temporal 
distance of the Holocaust in one study (Peetz et al., 2010). Again, a variety of different types of 
proximity are central to the understanding of collective guilt.  
Literature Review  
The literature about immigration is extensive; researchers across countries use the same 
types of analyses to determine which factors influence public opinions about migration. Much of 
the world has felt minimal impacts of the Syrian Refugee Crisis; aside from Europe and the 
Middle East, the most contentious migration debates are on Mexican immigration to the United 
States. The literature, however points to multiple factors which can are discussed throughout the 
world. There are distinct similarities among the varying countries, but differences exist when 
cultural and ethnic variables are taken into account. 
Gender 
 When considering the variable of gender, the assumption is often made that men have 
more negative opinions than women on immigration. Women are described as being more 
emotional and thus being more open to the admittance of refugees, especially when these 
refugees are children. This argument is a source of debate throughout the literature. The 
argument has not been made that men are more likely to oppose immigration than women. 
Research in the United States and Canada found that women are less accepting of refugees than 
men (Espenshade & Calhoun, 1994). Within this literature, no conclusion exists as to why this 
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may be the case. Calhoun and Espenshade infer that the negative attitude may stem from values 
more present in females such as religious beliefs, economic self-reliance, speaking English and 
voting in elections (Espenshade & Calhoun, 1994). 
 Men are traditionally deemed more rational, more violent and less emotional. Despite 
whether or not this belief is accurate, it has led to the mindset that men have harsher attitudes 
towards refugees and migrants. A recent study conducted across the E.U. however, found that 
men in all countries evaluated, had more negative attitudes towards refugees (Cides & Citren, 
2007). These researchers dismissed the importance of this factor. The focus of the study was on 
subjective and individual factors and their role in determining attitudes toward the refugee crisis; 
gender was analyzed in conjunction with other factors and was not one of the central findings of 
the study. A Mori poll conducted in the UK produced similar results. Men were more likely to 
take a harder stance toward asylum seekers (Mori Social Research Institute, 2002).  
Education and Social Class 
 Education and social class are traditionally evaluated separately throughout the literature, 
but for the purpose of this review, are grouped as the arguments often overlap. There is a 
consensus in the literature that education and social class shape opinions about immigrants. 
There is a strong positive correlation between education and positive attitudes towards migrants; 
the same is true for higher social class. 
 Two main camps of researchers exist which attempt to explain how education and social 
class and attitude towards immigrants demonstrate a positive correlation. The first of these two 
arguments is based on the effects of education. The literature posits that those with a better 
education are more tolerant because of an increased depth of exposure to different cultures 
(Case, Greely & Fuchs, 1989). This argument is made by scholars researching multiple 
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countries. This camp of researchers describes the correlation between education and positive 
attitudes towards refugees as stemming from a lack of ignorance. More educated individuals 
understand immigration policies, political situations in other countries, and approach the concept 
of immigration more holistically. They also are more educated on the effects of immigration in 
their country. In a similar argument, Case and Greeley state that the educated individuals have, 
“wider knowledge, more critical habits of thought, greater security, or merely a more 
sophisticated defense of their class interests” (Case, Greely & Fuchs, 1989).   
 The other main camp of researchers posits that economic security and occupational 
prestige lead the more educated population to think more positively of immigration. These 
individuals have no fear of losing their jobs to low-skilled immigrants; they are also generally 
financially stable and do not suffer economic consequences with increased immigration 
(Espenshade & Hampstead, 1996; Sheve & Slaughter, 2001; Mayda, 2006). Uneducated 
populations are less receptive towards immigration because they work low-skill jobs, which are 
often the first to be filled by immigrant workers. A study conducted in Europe made this 
argument, saying that no correlation existed between income and attitude towards refugees. The 
variable they found to be most important was the perception of economic well-being. If an 
individual feels their economic security is under threat, regardless of their income, they will 
respond more negatively towards refugees (Cides & Citren, 2007).   
Individual Factors 
 In addition to age, gender, and education, the majority of researchers also mention the 
importance of more subjective, individual factors which differ across cultures. Connection with 
immigrants is a key factor in determining attitudes towards them. If an individual is of the same 
background as the immigrants in question, they are more likely to have positive perceptions 
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(Espenshade & Hampstead, 1996). Opinions about the ideal level of state interventionism also 
influence attitudes. This argument is more prevalent in European states, where intervention is 
less frequent than in the United States (Taylor, 2015). Other arguments include perceptions of 
the importance of a country’s homogeneity, and other cultural factors. These factors differ in 
regards to individual countries, and thus do not appear as frequently in the literature.  
Age 
 There is an overall consensus throughout the literature about the correlation between age 
and apprehension towards immigration. Researchers have overwhelmingly found that as age 
increases, attitudes toward immigrants and refugees become more negative. The explanations for 
this phenomenon vary. The most frequently made argument relates age to political ideology. 
Older individuals are more likely to be conservative and in accordance with their ideology, 
oppose immigration (Espenshade & Calhoun 1993). Other researchers cited different 
explanations for this phenomenon. Many disagree that there is a correlation between age and 
conservative ideology, but few offer alternative explanations. Espenshade and Calhoun contend 
that older people are more resistant to social change and face lower job security as they grow 
older (Espenshade & Calhoun 1993). 	 	
 The literature about the relationship between age and perceptions towards refugees is 
focused mainly on the United States. Considering that approximately two-thirds of the world’s 
asylum seekers and refugees reach their final destination in the European Union, this gap in the 
literature is surprising. In 2015, Germany pledged to accept a million refugees, making it the 
leader in the European Union (BBC, 2016). The influx of Muslim immigrants began in the 
1990’s and is ongoing (Alibi, 2009). Germany is still in the process of integrating these 
individuals into the society (Alibi, 2009). Research on these demographic changes has been 
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conducted on the European Union as a whole, which provides some insight into factors which 
may differ from the North American focus of the literature. The same factors are the focal point 
of the analysis: age, gender, economic security, and education. The trends established throughout 
the literature hold true for both the United States and the European Union as a whole.  
In European countries, the historical context may influence more nuanced factors playing 
a role in attitudes towards refugee admittance. Throughout the EU, attitudes towards 
homogeneity are central to explaining attitudes towards refugee populations. The United States 
boasts a diverse population. This is not to say that there are not Americans who dream of an 
ethnically or racially homogenous version of the United States, but the rhetoric surrounding 
American society’s diversity is that of the “melting pot” Europe has historically remained 
homogenous until recently. The preference for cultural unity is strong. Researchers found that 
across Europe, 91% of individuals said it was important that residents of a country spoke a 
common language; only 26% disagree with the claim that a country is better if everyone shares 
the same beliefs and customs (Hatton, 2015). The homogeneity phenomenon creates a unique 
situation in Europe, and Germany’s unique historical legacy continues to complicate the effect 
this phenomenon may have on the individual attitudes and the country’s policies.  
 Citing one or a combination of factors which influence perceptions of migration is 
impossible. Variables such as gender, education, economic security, and age are deemed 
important across the literature, regardless of the country. The individual factors explain the 
differences which exist across state lines. The importance of a country’s homogeneity for 
European respondents is especially important in regards to Germany. This desire for 
homogeneity in Germany was the central factor in the rise of the Third Reich, so the relationship 
that contemporary Germany has with this idea is complicated and nuanced. (Weber, 2009). The 
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fall of the Third Reich and the reputation Germany received from the international community 
led to immense suffering and a loss of identity for the German people. These memories of World 
War II’s aftermath may lead older individuals to have different opinions about the need for 
homogeneity in a country and thus react more positively towards immigrants. The literature 
makes it evident that younger individuals have positive opinions about immigration and 
refugees, but the combination of homogeneity as a variable and Germany’s historical context 
may reverse this trend.  
Research Design  
My research focuses on German public opinion towards refugee admittance and the effect 
of German collective guilt on perception. To operationalize collective guilt, I use age as a proxy. 
Those over the age of 65 saw the direct consequences of the war and lived through 
reconstruction before the German economic boom (Wirtschaftswunder) in the early 1950’s. For 
the first phase of my research, I compare overall German public opinion data with that of other 
countries to create a baseline understanding of how Germany differs from its European 
counterparts. The other countries included in this analysis are Italy, France, Hungary, Poland, 
Sweden, and the Netherlands. For this phase of the research, I predict that overall attitudes will 
mirror the countries’ political climates. If this is the case, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Germany 
will have the most positive attitudes and Hungary and Poland will have the most negative 
attitudes. Such findings will support the reliability of the data and allow me to confidently utilize 
the data for the remainder of my research questions.  The theoretical framework of my research 
builds on the idea that older individuals are more likely to experience collective guilt because 
they remember the aftermath of World War II., I conduct an analysis on the basis of age. I 
predict that older German individuals’ public opinions will differ when compared to (a) other age 
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groups in Germany and (b) older age groups in the other European countries. If my hypotheses 
are correct, the overall relationship between age and perceptions towards refugees in Germany 
will differ significantly from those in other countries because older individuals employ collective 
guilt in their decision-making processes.  
The second phase of my research consults the trends present throughout the immigration 
literature. In my preliminary research, I found widespread consensus regarding the effects of 
gender and economic security on attitudes towards immigration. Analysis of these factors 
throughout the literature is as extensively as age, and their effects are undoubtedly present in my 
dataset. To control for these factors as extensively as possible, I analyze the country-level data 
on the basis of gender and economic security as well. No literature exists on the relationship 
between collective guilt and economic security or collective guilt and gender; thus I predict that 
these factors will be less affected by collective guilt than the variable of age. If this is the case, 
my data will more closely align with the trends posited throughout the literature when examined 
on the basis of gender and economic security. It is important to note that economic security, age, 
and gender are not variables which exist independently of one another, but this analysis allows 
me to isolate the effect of age as methodically as possible.  
The question of homogeneity frames the third phase of my research question. The idea of 
cultural homogeneity is an individual-level factor which is present throughout the literature, but 
is especially prevalent in Europe because of the historically homogenous nature of Western 
European countries, especially. Research on Germany’s relationship with the idea of 
homogeneity has been conducted, and trends are similar to those present in the rest of Europe 
(Hatton, 2015). Despite this, there is an added dynamic to the homogeneity variable which is not 
present throughout the rest of Europe. A major goal of the Third Reich was to create 
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homogeneity throughout Germany and greater Europe, and many ideas surrounding the refugee 
crisis play off similar ethnocentric rhetoric. The literature about this topic in Germany is 
contradictory. Collective guilt is definitive in the creation of German culture, which creates unity 
and a shared identity. Immigrants and individuals do not share the burden of carrying this 
collective guilt, and thus may not be accepted into Germany. This lack of commonality may 
inform a respondents’ desire for homogeneity, as immigrants fail to be legitimately integrated 
into society without directly experiencing this shared guilt. On the other hand, the collective guilt 
that defines German culture stems from a history of exclusion and persecution of outsiders which 
creates a general fear. Germany constantly tries to break from the Nazi stereotype which has 
remained a part of the culture for so long, and being viewed as open and accepting of refugees 
and immigrants subverts the discourse in a way which frames Germany as a moral leader.  
This paradox demonstrates that the concept of country homogeneity is vital in connecting 
the refugee crisis to the Holocaust. The complicated relationship Germany has with the idea of 
homogeneity makes it a key factor in the analysis of attitudes towards refugees. While much of 
the homogeneity literature perceives overall trends to correspond with those present throughout 
the rest of Europe, this majority of this research was conducted prior to the 2015 refugee crisis. 
The discourse surrounding this event focused on Germany being a “moral leader” (BBC, 2015). I 
predict that a German respondent placing less importance on their country’s homogeneity will 
lead to an increase in tolerance for refugees because of the contemporary political context.  The 
following hypotheses correspond to the three different phases of my research as detailed above. 
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Hypotheses 
H1: Age and APS in Germany will have a positive relationship, whereas this relationship will be 
negative for the other countries in the sample  
H2: There will be significant relationships between other demographic variables (gender and 
economic security) and APS in Germany 
H3: Age and homogeneity scores will have a stronger and more positive relationship in Germany 
than in the Netherlands 
Data  
 I conduct my research by analyzing portions of the 2016 Pew Research Center’s Global 
Attitudes Dataset. During the early stages of my research, I found a lack of data on collective 
guilt and its effect on the German public today. To combat this issue, my initial research design 
included a survey I had written with an emotional newspaper article to operationalize the concept 
of collective guilt. Due to time and financial constraints, I chose to utilize an existing dataset. In 
addition to the aforementioned constraints, it was difficult to find respondents over the age of 65 
to participate in an online survey I fielded independently. I selected the Pew dataset for a variety 
of reasons, but most importantly because it was conducted in 2016. The focus of my study is to 
analyze attitudes in the wake of the refugee crisis, which began in 2015. Although the focus of 
the Global Attitudes Dataset is not the refugee crisis, it included a battery of questions which 
allow me to operationalize collective guilt using age as a proxy. Additionally, the sample size is 
representative and includes enough countries for me to conduct a holistic comparison.2 I 
acknowledge the shortcomings of the data, but the concept of homogeneity is central to the idea 
																																																						
2 The biggest shortcoming of the sample is my inability to analyze the construction of proximity. Because I did not 
collect my own data, it was impossible for me to combine the existing theory on proximity and collective guilt to 
create a holistic measure of proximity.  
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of collective guilt. With the existing time and resource constraints, the Pew data provided a good 
alternative to the creation of my own data, but leaves room for more holistic measures to be 
created in future studies.  
The Pew researchers surveyed a total of 23,462 individuals in nineteen countries across 
the globe. The participants answered total of 132 questions. The survey asks a variety of 
questions about world trends but focuses heavily on current global issues such as the rise of 
China, nationalism, and immigration. For the purpose of my analysis, I cleaned the data to 
include only countries surveyed relevant to this analysis. Countries outside of Europe were 
excluded, as well as the United Kingdom and Spain.3 The final dataset included data from seven 
different countries: Germany, Italy, France, Hungary, Poland, Sweden and the Netherlands. I 
then identified the four question sets in the survey that I found to be most applicable to the 
research question. These included questions that asked (a) explicitly about refugee admittance 
and immigration (b) framed the refugee crisis as a religious issue or (c) provided insight into the 
respondents’ desire for homogeneity in their country (Appendix A). The idea of the refugee 
crisis as a religious issue is important to the operationalization of collective guilt because it 
explicitly mentions the religiosity of immigrants and creates a more apparent connection between 
the refugee crisis and the religious-based discrimination of the Holocaust. I also include the 
questions focusing on homogeneity because of how central the idea is to immigration in 
Germany. 
																																																						
3 The Global Attitudes Dataset Survey was collected in the Spring of 2016, immediately prior to the UK Brexit 
Referendum of 2016. The results of the vote identified that the majority of UK citizens wanted to withdraw from the 
European Union, contrary to the wishes of the central government. The widespread upheaval and 
disenfranchisement of the people led me to exclude the country because of a potential break from the EU and its 
refugee admittance policies. As indicated in the introduction, Spain has not seen a rise in far-right parties, as other 
European countries have because of the large Muslim population. The difference in demography here also led me to 
exclude the Spain data from the analysis.   
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I also include demographic information in the final dataset. The final dataset included 
responses from 5,319 participants; 813 from Germany, 895 from France, 648 from Hungary, 758 
from Italy, 857 from the Netherlands, 458 from Poland, and 890 from Sweden. Table 1 (below) 
demonstrates the results of this initial data cleaning and preliminary mean APS calculation. 
Table 1 speaks to the first dependent variable I test: APS. As I predict, Sweden, the Netherlands, 
and Germany have the most positive APS and Poland and Hungary have the most negative 
scores. These trends mirror the 2016 political trends and climates of these countries and thus 
provide a reliable sample for the age-level data analysis. 
Independent Variable 
	
The next portion of the data cleaning involves the creation of age groups. This step is 
vital to the creation of the independent variable. The most important group is the oldest German 
age group because of their direct experiences with the aftermath of World War II and collective 
guilt. I sort the survey respondents into six different age groups: 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-
64, and ³65. I break each country-level dataset down into these age groups and create subset 
aggregate perception scores for each group in each country. Table 2 demonstrates the perception 
scores broken down by both age group and country. The youngest respondents are 18, and the 
oldest included in the dataset are 97 years old. The oldest age group has a variance which may 
affect their relationship with collective guilt. A respondent born in 1920 and a respondent born in 
1948 will have different memories of the war and its aftermath. The selection as 65 as a cutoff 
date creates a uniform justification for individuals included in the oldest data subset and 
generates a sample large enough to compare reliably.  
 
22 
 The third portion of my data cleaning is vital to establishing the connection between age 
and APS within the data. In my analysis and results section, I conduct a battery of statistical tests 
to analyze gender and economic security and create a more nuanced model of the role of age 
when intersected with these different demographics. I recode the variable of numerically 
(male=0, female=1). The Pew Global Attitudes Dataset does not include a question asking for a 
numerical measure of income but instead asks respondents to report three measures related to 
their economic security over the past year (Appendix A). The questions focus on the 
respondents’ ability to afford certain commodities (food, healthcare, clothing). This method of 
measuring income is more applicable to the examination of immigrant attitudes because of the 
geographic variance in cost of living. Economic insecurity and income are both used in the 
literature to explain attitudes towards immigration, but the central idea is economic insecurity 
and a fear of immigrants filling low-wage positions (Sheve & Slaughter, 2001). To create 
numeric measures of economic security, I give the respondents a score based on their yes or no 
responses to the three questions (0=no, 1=yes). The respondents have economic security scores 
ranging from zero to three. A score of zero indicates that the respondent has not had trouble 
affording food, clothing, or medical care for themselves or their families within the past year, 
and each added numerical value indicates difficulty affording an item in one of those three 
categories. A score of three indicates that the respondent has had difficulty affording food, 
clothing, and medical care within the past year. I later use these scores to determine the effect 
economic security has on respondents’ overall attitudes (APS).  
Dependent Variable 
	
To create my first dependent variable, I re-code the responses to these questions on a 
numerical four-point scale to create an aggregate measure of opinion towards refugees 
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(Appendix B). Throughout the remainder of this paper, I will refer to these scores as APS 
(aggregate perception scores). To create these scores, I rank the answer choices to my selected 
survey questions from most positive to least positive and give each answer choice a 
corresponding number (i.e. very unfavorable=1, mostly unfavorable=2, mostly favorable=3, very 
favorable=4 or in regards to questions gauging the importance of different aspects of 
homogeneity 1=very important, 2=somewhat important, 3=not very important, 4=not at all 
important). Within the four different question sets, there are eight questions which I calculate 
into the participants’ final APS. The scores range from eight to thirty-one with a higher score 
indicating a more positive attitude towards refugees. I remove survey participants who responded 
to one of the questions with “I don’t know” or who declined to answer, from the final dataset.  
	
  
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Preliminary APS statistics by country and age group 
While the religiosity aspect of the aggregate perception score is important, homogeneity 
underpins this idea as well. Homogeneity of religious beliefs was a platform of the Nazi party, so 
an analysis of homogeneity can speak to the role of religion in collective guilt. (Hatton, 2015). 
The survey questions about homogeneity also prompt the respondent to respond about the 
perceived importance of a shared religion in their country.  
To isolate the role of the desire for homogeneity in a country, I create homogeneity 
scores for each individual. This score is a subset of the aggregate perception score (Table 1), but 
Mean APS by Country 
Country n Mean APS 
Germany 813 20.134 
France 895 19.904 
Hungary 648 14.741 
Italy 758 15.955 
Netherlands 857 19.810 
Poland 458 15.989 
Sweden 890 21.331 
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I isolate the questions which focus on the respondent’s desire for homogeneity (Appendix A, 
q85a-d). The consistency of the two measures allows me to compare the desire for homogeneity 
with the other factors which may affect a participant’s overall aggregate perception score. These 
questions focus on the importance of four different factors the literature often discusses in 
regards to homogeneity: shared religion, shared language, common customs and traditions, and a 
common birthplace. The homogeneity scores follow the same coding schema as the aggregate 
perception scores, but scores range from four to sixteen instead of from eight to thirty-one. 
Lower scores indicate that the participants feel very strongly about homogeneity in their country, 
and believe that all four measures of homogeneity are important for an individual’s integration 
into their country. Higher scores demonstrate that a participant does not believe that these 
measures of homogeneity are important for membership.  
 
 
                           
 
 
 
Table 2. Mean Homogeneity Scores Broken Down by Country 
Table 2 portrays the mean calculated homogeneity scores for all countries. They follow 
the overall trends present in the APS scores. In this measure, Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Sweden believe that homogeneity is not central to the integration of an individual into society.  
The homogeneity scores follow the same trends as the average APS (Table 3). From these 
descriptive statistics, there is no indicator that German participants view homogeneity differently 
Mean Homogeneity Scores by Country 
Country n Mean HS 
Germany 813 9.02 
France 895 8.66 
Hungary 648 6.43 
Italy 758 6.96 
Netherlands 857 8.80 
Poland 458 6.85 
Sweden 890 9.98 
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than participants from other countries. I further analyze the homogeneity scores in the same way 
as the aggregate perception scores and break them down by both country and age group. 
Results and Discussion 
Country Trends 
  Table 3. Aggregate Perception Scores Broken Down by Age Group and Country  
The trends for all countries mirror the trends discussed in the literature, with the ³65 age 
group having the most negative APS and the youngest age groups having the highest APS scores.  
The average scores decline steadily with an increase in age, indicating that the linear relationship 
described in literature may exist in some form for the countries included in my sample. Similar 
to the results in Table 1, Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands uniformly have the highest APS 
across age groups. France and Italy remain in the middle while Hungary and Poland have the 
lowest. In Figure 1 (below), I present these results graphically to demonstrate the differences in 
the linearity of the age-APS relationships for each country. It is interesting to note that Poland is 
the only country that does not appear to follow the linear trend. Despite the fact that Poland and 
Hungary have many similar political and cultural characteristics, their corresponding trends in 
Figure 1 differ. Overall, there is a visible downward trend, but very little variation throughout the 
countries surveyed.  
 
Average Aggregate Perception Score by Country 
Age Group Germany Sweden Netherlands France Italy Hungary Poland 
18-24 22.68 22.68 20.55 21.21 17.56 15.68 15.63 
25-34 20.92 23.39 20.98 20.60 16.13 15.11 16.20 
35-44 20.84 22.99 20.76 20.72 16.69 14.75 16.90 
45-54 20.55 22.10 20.00 20.65 16.04 15.02 15.65 
55-64 20.12 20.83 20.01 19.63 15.63 14.58 16.48 
³65 18.98 19.74 18.45 18.49 14.94 14.20  14.83 
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Figure 1. Country level APS broken down by age groups 
When exploring overall relationships between age and aggregate perception scores, I use 
a Pearson correlation test to determine the relationship between age and aggregate perception 
scores establish a baseline measure of the strength of the relationship for each of the countries in 
my sample. The individual trend lines for each of the countries demonstrate a negative linear 
relationship between age and APS score, overall. I display r squared values for each country in 
Table 4. These values are low for all countries surveyed, demonstrating that less than ten percent 
of the dataset’s variability can be explained by the model. It is interesting to note, however that 
these trends are the strongest for the countries with the highest average APS scores (Table 1). 
The r-squared values for all countries demonstrate that age is not a reliable indicator of aggregate 
perception score, despite there being a negative linear trend. In Figure 2, I plot the individual 
perception scores for the German sample. The graph demonstrates the same trend as the table. 
The linear model does not account for variability in data points. 
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Table 4. Pearson correlation coefficients for the relationship between age and APS 
The relationship between age and APS in Germany without controlling for gender, 
income, or desire for homogeneity is not different than that of the other countries in the dataset. 
To isolate the independent variable and operationalize collective guilt, I compare the Netherlands 
and Germany for the remainder of the analysis. These two countries demonstrate similar trends 
throughout the initial analysis. They Pearson correlation resulted in similar correlation 
coefficients for both countries. Additionally, APS and homogeneity scores are relatively 
consistent across all age groups. These similarities allow me to analyze gender and income in 
two very similar populations to control for their effects and isolate the variable of age.  
Figure 2. Scatterplot with regression indicating the relationship between APS and age in Germany (r-
squared=0.08) 
Age-APS correlation 
Country Correlation Coefficient  
Germany -0.289 
France -0.236 
Hungary -0.116 
Italy -0.194 
Netherlands -0.269 
Poland -0.090 
Sweden -0.336 
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Netherlands and Germany Comparison 
 The three demographic variables central to the analysis of both APS and homogeneity are 
age, gender, and economic security. Each demographic indicator is on a different scale, because 
of the nature of the variables. To combat this issue, I recode the variables to conduct a binary 
analysis. I break the economic security scores back down into the three original categories: the 
ability to afford food, the ability to afford medical care, and the ability to afford clothing. This 
allows me to more robustly analyze the different aspects of economic security within the sample 
and attribute for the differences in social programs for the two countries that may significantly 
affect measures of economic insecurity. I break age down into a binary score as well. In 
accordance with my age group breakdown from the initial data cleaning, I create two different 
age groups. I code the individuals under the age of 65 as zero, and individuals over the age of 65 
as one. This coding schema allows me to analyze the variable of age in accordance with the cut-
off age I established. It also allows for a larger sample size for the age groups and a more robust 
analysis. Gender remains coded as zero and one as well. The uniform binary nature of the 
variables allows for a comparable statistical analysis of the different demographic variables and 
creates a more uniform sample for comparison. I conduct a linear regression for the relationship 
between each of the demographic variables and APS for the Netherlands and Germany. To 
further isolate the importance of homogeneity, I conduct a linear regression with each of the 
demographic variables and the homogeneity scores. 
Aggregate Perception Score (APS)  
To analyze the relationship between the three demographic variables and aggregate 
perception score (APS), I utilize a linear regression with the three binary variables and APS. 
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Figure 3 (below) contains the summary output of this regression for the Netherlands. Figure 4 
(below) contains the regression output for Germany. 
In the Netherlands sample regression output, the variable of age has a p-value of less than 
0.000, indicates that age is statistically significant at p<.05. This significance demonstrates that 
older individuals’ (coded as 1, age ³65) have significantly different scores than those in the 
younger age bracket (coded as 0, age<65). Given the trend illustrated by the linear regression 
(Table 4), this significance demonstrates that the ³65 age group has significantly lower aggregate 
perceptions scores than those in the younger age group. Gender and all three economic security 
p-values were all greater than 0.1, indicating that none of these variables are statistically 
significant.  
 
Figure 3. Regression statistics for relationship between age, gender, economic security and APS in the 
Netherlands, *p<.10, **p<.05 (n=857)  
 
The strength of the relationship between the three measures of economic security and 
APS vary, indicating that the breakdown of the economic security score is vital in understanding 
the nuances of economic insecurity and its effect on perceptions. The inability to afford medical 
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care has a p-value of 0.956, which is the highest of the three indicators of economic security. 
This p-value varies substantially from those of the other two indicators, with the inability to 
afford food almost reaching the threshold for significance at p<.1. The analysis of the gender 
variable points to a similar trend. The p-value is .065, which demonstrates that there is no 
significant correlation between gender and APS in the Netherlands sample. The regression 
demonstrates that the majority of these demographic measures do not play a significant role in 
determining APS, indicating that age, along with other factors must be central to the formulation 
of perception. 
 
Figure 4. Regression statistics for relationship between age, gender, economic security and APS in the 
Germany sample, *p<.10, **p<.05 (n=813) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 demonstrates the results of the correlation between the three demographic 
variables and APS in Germany. I choose to compare the Netherlands and Germany in the 
statistical analysis because of the similarity in trends of the other measures. Prior to the binary 
coding of the age variable, the relationship between age and APS appeared identical for 
Germany and the Netherlands, as both had r-squared values of 0.08. In comparing all three 
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demographic measures for Germany and the Netherlands, the differences in the samples are 
apparent. In Germany, the p-value for gender is 0.808, indicating that this variable is significant 
at the p<.10 level. The p-value for gender in the Netherlands is 0.654. In the Netherlands, age is 
the most significant determinant of APS (p-value=0.000), whereas the relationship between age 
and APS in Germany is very insignificant (p-value=0.723). The relationships between the three 
measures of economic security and APS vary largely across the two analyses indicating that 
different types of economic insecurity influence respondents in the two countries very 
differently.  
Homogeneity Scores 
 To further isolate the idea of homogeneity and its importance in establishing overall 
opinions towards refugees, I analyze the same demographic variables of gender, age and, 
economic security, using the calculated homogeneity scores as the dependent variable. I conduct 
this analysis for both Germany and the Netherlands to see if the desire for homogeneity affects 
German respondents differently. Figure 5 portrays the results of this analysis. The demographic 
indicators are not significant in the establishment of the homogeneity scores in Germany, despite 
there being a significant relationship between gender and APS in the previous regression 
analysis. Age remains very insignificant in the establishment of the homogeneity score, with a 
similar p-value as in the APS regression analysis. The p-values for the three values of economic 
security also remain insignificant but are more uniform than in the analysis of APS. 
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Figure 5. Regression statistics for relationship between age, gender, economic security and homogeneity 
scores in Germany, *p<.10, **p<.05 (n=813) 
 
 In the Netherlands, the relationship between demographic measures and homogeneity 
scores is also different than the relationship between demographic measures and APS.  In this 
analysis, age is significant at the p<.05 level. The other demographic indicators become 
insignificant with the introduction of homogeneity as the dependent variable. The fact that age 
remains significant at the p>.05 level for both scores in the Netherlands, but is insignificant for 
both scores in Germany, indicates that age is a more accurate predictor of perception in the 
Netherlands, no matter which method is used to frame the issue. The relationship between age 
and each of the two dependent variables is insignificant in Germany. The lack of significance in 
either regression demonstrates that asking the respondent to self-report on their ideas about the 
importance of homogeneity in their country does not capture the differences in the relationship 
between age and perception.  
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Figure 6. Regression statistics for relationship between age, gender, economic security and homogeneity 
scores in the Netherlands, *p<.10, **p<.05 (n=857) 
 
 The differences in the regression analyses of the two countries demonstrate that age is a 
more significant indicator of perception across the board for the Netherlands. In both the APS 
and the homogeneity score analysis, age was insignificant in the determination of results in 
Germany. This difference indicates that age is not a strong determinant of perception towards 
refugees in Germany when compared to the Netherlands. However, this trend is only illustrated 
in the regression analysis when I reconstruct age as a binary variable. The average perception 
scores calculated for each of the age groups do not demonstrate that older individuals in 
Germany have less negative opinions of refugees. The average aggregate perception scores for 
Germany mirror those of the other countries, when I present the variable categorically. These 
similarities lead me to conclude that the data do not support my first hypothesis. Despite this, the 
regression analysis of APS in Germany indicates that age cannot be used to accurately determine 
what a respondent’s APS will be.  
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 The relationship between age and APS for Germany is one of the least significant 
demographic variables of the five included in the regression analysis, meaning that gender, 
income, and two of the measures of economic security are better predictors of APS. In Germany, 
gender is the most significant indicator of APS, corresponding to discussed trends in the 
literature about the effect of gender on immigration. The values of economic security are not 
significant indicators of APS, but the inability to afford medical care and food are the two with 
relatively low p-values when compared with the inability to afford clothing variable. This 
relationship leads me to conclude that the data supports my second hypothesis. Gender is a 
strong indicator of APS, and two of three measures of economic insecurity better explain APS 
than the variable of age does. The strength of the relationship between gender and APS in 
Germany is interesting when compared to the weakness of the same relationship in the 
Netherlands. While gender is an insignificant predictor in the Netherlands, age is a significant 
one.  
The measures of economic security also vary immensely between the Netherlands and 
Germany, indicating that outside factors explain the strength of these variables in determining 
APS. The stark differences in these results led to me compare social programs in Germany and in 
the Netherlands to determine the prevalence of economic insecurity. While both governments are 
liberal in their distribution of welfare, the Netherlands’ social programs are more robust. With 
one of the most expensive welfare states in the world, the Dutch government provides a variety 
of programs which undoubtedly create differences in the way German and Dutch citizens 
perceive their economic insecurity (government.nl, 2017). While Germany is also very liberal in 
its welfare policies, the social programs in place are not nearly as extensive as those in the 
Netherlands. This political structures may explain the differences in the three measures of 
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insecurity, and may slightly impact the other categories as well. Gender may be more affected 
than age because of constructions of gender present in the dominant discourse of individual 
societies. Despite this difference, age and gender remain inherent to a person’s existence and 
cannot be completely shifted or changed by a social welfare program.  
 The statistical analysis of homogeneity scores resulted in similar trends as the APS 
scores. The most prominent difference in the analysis of homogeneity across the two countries 
was the difference in the significance of gender for the German sample. The strength of the 
demographic variables remained virtually the same for the Netherlands regression. The fact that 
p-value for the variable of age in the homogeneity regression did not differ from that of the APS 
regression indicates that the desire for homogeneity, as presented in the survey, does not 
significantly affect how older German individuals formulate their opinions about immigration. 
This consistency demonstrates that my third hypothesis regarding the desire for homogeneity is 
unsupported by the data collected. The fact that age remained consistently significant for the 
Netherlands indicates that the adapting the APS to include only homogeneity did not change 
their relationship with age. This also relies largely on the measure of homogeneity I utilized, as 
there are other aspects of homogeneity which may affect these results. The Pew researchers 
conducted the survey worldwide and measures of homogeneity may not relate to different 
countries’ current political climate differently and thus elicit different results. A more tailored 
measure of homogeneity which draws from German current events could affect the respondents 
differently than the general battery of questions present in this survey. In conclusion, the measure 
of homogeneity I utilized indicated no relationship between age and desire for homogeneity in 
Germany, but this does lead me to conclude that age and desire for homogeneity are unrelated.  
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  There are shifts in the other variables however, which may indicate that the desire for 
homogeneity affects individuals of different genders or economic security levels more than it 
affects individuals of different ages. For the Netherlands sample, the p-values for gender and one 
of the economic security variables approach significance at the p>0.1 level. This shift from the 
APS regression indicates that the homogeneity questions do affect the sample somehow, but the 
nuances of this relationship are unclear from the data I analyze.  
 It is important to note that age is not a perfect proxy for collective guilt and that desire for 
homogeneity may not be the key factor which leads German respondents to draw on their 
collective guilt in the decision-making process. The subjectivity of both homogeneity and 
collective guilt makes the operationalization of these two variables difficult. Additionally, the 
questions in the Pew Global Attitudes Survey do not create an all-encompassing measure of 
perception towards refugees. It is plausible that the global nature of the questions led to 
oversights of country-level or cultural factors which influence outcomes of the analysis.   
Conclusion 
 I began my research with the intention of analyzing an idea I had learned about at home 
and in class for years in the context of a modern phenomenon: The Syrian Refugee Crisis. I 
hypothesized that older individuals who experienced the aftermath of World War II and the 
Holocaust more directly would operationalize their collective guilt when formulating their 
opinions about the 2015 refugee crisis. I elected to use age as a proxy for collective guilt, as no 
established measures existed for the concept. Due to the lack of established research on this 
topic, I decided to adapt an existing dataset to fit my research question. Based on my predictions 
and the dataset I chose, I created three hypotheses which corresponded to the three different 
phases of my research.  
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 For the first phase of my research, I drew questions from the 2016 Pew Global Attitudes 
Survey which focused on opinions towards migrants and refugees. I elected to use a battery of 
seven questions which I deemed relevant to my analysis for seven European countries included 
in the study. I based the primary analysis for the first phase of my research on the creation of 
aggregate perception scores (APS) which was a measure for each person which aggregated their 
responses to the questions I elected to use from the Pew survey. I hypothesized that the APS 
would be lower for older individuals from German countries than for older individuals from 
other European countries based on my theory that collective guilt influences decision-making. 
Overall, the results of this analysis demonstrated no significant difference between Germany and 
the other countries in my dataset. Differences in results could be attributed to differing political 
climates, but all of the countries followed the trends outlined in the literature.  
 The second part of my research question drew on the role of other demographic 
indicators in the creation of the APS and homogeneity scores. Other variables such as gender, 
income, proximity to immigrants, and a respondent’s heritage were frequently mentioned 
throughout my research. I chose to analyze measures of gender and economic stability to 
determine if these variables followed the trends outlined in the literature. I hypothesized that 
gender and economic stability in Germany would more clearly predict APS than age would. 
Through my regression analysis, I found that age is not a significant factor in predicting APS or 
homogeneity, but that gender is a significant factor in predicting APS in Germany. I also 
compared these trends to those present in the Netherlands data.  
 The third portion of my research focused on the role of homogeneity in the 
operationalization of collective guilt in decision-making. I created homogeneity scores by 
selecting a subset of the questions I used in the creation of the APS in attempt to isolate how 
 
38 
desire for homogeneity correlates with the aforementioned demographic variables. I 
hypothesized that German respondents would be more likely to respond positively when asked 
about their opinions on the importance of homogeneity in their country. The results of my 
regression analysis demonstrated that the relationship between age and homogeneity score was 
insignificant, meaning that age is not a good predictor of the desire for homogeneity in Germany. 
The significance of other demographic variables shifted, however when I restricted the 
dependent variable by the respondents’ desire for homogeneity.  
 My research contributes to the literature by demonstrating that some aspect of Germany 
or German culture makes age less effective as a predictor of perception when compared to other 
European countries. Such findings have policy implications, as evidenced by the massive influx 
of refugees to Germany from 2015 onward. Collective guilt of older individuals may have played 
a role in the liberal platform the country took in regards to the refugee crisis. This idea will 
continue to have policy implications as time progresses and less German citizens have strong 
recollections of the postwar period. It is likely that Germany’s liberal attitudes towards refugees 
will continue to shift as memories of the Holocaust and Germany’s subjugation in the 
international system begin to wane. I hope that this research will lead others to continue 
examining the role collective guilt plays in German culture and politics, as well as teach younger 
generations about the phenomenon.  
 In the future, I hope to conduct follow-up research by creating my own battery of 
questions and conduct the survey with a large sample size of individuals over the age of 65. I 
hope to utilize a stimulus or primer to operationalize collective guilt more reliably in a controlled 
setting. I also would like to conduct follow-up interviews with older German individuals to 
gauge similarities in manifestations of collective guilt. In terms of my analysis, I would like to 
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compare the trends I found in Germany to trends in other countries. Poland and Hungary have 
seen a considerable rise in far-right parties, and I am interested to see which one of my variables 
would be most significant in explaining the most extreme trends in Europe.  
 Additionally, I would be interested in conducting more analysis on the role of individual-
level factors such as proximity to immigrants both geographically and in regards to heritage. 
Other individual factors unique to Germany would be relatives’ direct involvement in World 
War II or family ties to the Third Reich. As I previously mentioned, the role of geographic 
location and culture in former East and West Germany also creates new variables which would 
strengthen my model. I would also be interested in examining the role that education plays in the 
manifestation of collective guilt in younger Germans. The way that public schools teach the 
Holocaust and World War II varies by state, as states have control over students and curriculums 
within their territory. Education is central to the perpetuation of these ideas, and the way that the 
Holocaust has been taught has changed significantly since the end of World War II.  
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Appendix A 
 
Pew 2016 Global Attitudes Survey Questions  
 
Q36 I'd like you to rate some different groups of people in (survey country) according to how 
you feel about them. For each group, please tell me whether your opinion is very 
favorable, mostly favorable, mostly unfavorable or very unfavorable. (included in APS 
calculation) 
a. Jews  
b. Roma [IN UNITED KINGDOM: Gypsies or Roma] 
c. Muslims 
1 Very favorable 
2 Mostly favorable 
3 Mostly unfavorable 
4 Very unfavorable 
8 Don’t know (DO NOT READ) 
9 Refused (DO NOT READ) 
 
Q71 Do you think most Muslims in our country today want to adopt (survey country)’s 
customs and way of life or do you think that they want to be distinct from the larger 
(SURVEY COUNTRY NATIONALITY) society?  (included in APS calculation) 
1 Adopt customs 
2 Want to be distinct 
3 Both (DO NOT READ) 
8 Don’t know (DO NOT READ) 
9 Refused (DO NOT READ) 
 
Q72 In your opinion, how many Muslims in our country support extremist groups like the 
Islamic militant group in Iraq and Syria known as [ISIS]: would you say most, many, just 
some or very few? (included in APS calculation) 
1 Most 
2 Many 
3 Just some 
4 Very few 
8 Don’t know (DO NOT READ) 
9 Refused (DO NOT READ) 
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Q85 Some people say that the following things are important for being truly (SURVEY 
COUNTRY NATIONALITY). Others say they are not important. How important do 
you think each of the following is? [READ]* (included in APS and homogeneity score 
calculations) 
RANDOMIZE ITEMS 
a. to have been born in (survey country)  
b. to be able to speak (NATIONAL LANGUAGE OF SURVEY COUNTRY)  
c. to be a (INSERT DOMINANT DENOMINATION OF SURVEY COUNTRY)  
d. to share (SURVEY COUNTRY NATIONALITY) customs and traditions 
1 Very important 
2 Somewhat important 
3 Not very important 
4 Not at all important 
8 Don’t know (DO NOT READ) 
9 Refused (DO NOT READ)  
Q107 Gender [RECORD BY OBSERVATION]  
1 Male 
2 Female 
Q108 How old were you at your last birthday?  
______ years (RECORD AGE IN YEARS) 
97 97 or older 
98 Don’t know (DO NOT READ) 
99 Refused (DO NOT READ) 
Q115 Have there been times during the last year when you did not have enough money 
(INSERT)? (included in measure of economic security) 
RANDOMIZE ITEMS 
a. to buy food your family needed 
b. to pay for medical and health care your family needed 
c. to buy clothing your family needed 
1 Yes 
2  No 
8 Don’t know (DO NOT READ) 
9 Refused (DO NOT READ 
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Appendix B 
Numerical coding scales for survey responses  
 
Survey Response Recoded Value 
Very favorable  4 
Mostly favorable 3 
Mostly unfavorable 2 
Very unfavorable  1 
Don’t know excluded 
Refused excluded 
Most 1 
Many 2 
Just some 3 
Very few 4 
Very important 1 
Somewhat important 2 
Not very important 3 
Not at all important 4 
Adopt customs 1 
Want to be distinct 2 
Both excluded 
Yes 1 
No 0 
Male 1 
Female 2 
 
 
 
 
